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China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track (Agricultural Economics & Management)

China · China Agricultural University College of Economics & Management

104practice questions written to this syllabus
7subjects

What China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track is

China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track (Agricultural Economics & Management) is a PhD, fellowship and lectureship exam run by China Agricultural University College of Economics & Management, for candidates in China.

Format

Written specialised test 30% + interview 70%; at least 60 needed in each.

Sections

How to prepare for China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track

Where our 104 questions for it fall

Our reading of the syllabus, from the questions we have written to this exam; the exam body's own weighting, where published, is under Format above.

  1. Heaviest (87% of the questions): Institutional Economics (47); Development Economics (35); Economic Development and Agricultural Economies of the World (8).

    Start here: read these subjects' manuals first and work their questions until the reasoning is automatic.

  2. Middle band: Agricultural Development & Policy Analysis (6); Microeconomic Theory & Applications (4); Econometrics (3).

    One pass per subject, then mixed sets across them.

  3. Lighter: Agricultural Production Economics (1).

    Definitions, classifications and standard figures; quick to revise, easy marks to lose.

  4. Hardest share: Microeconomic Theory & Applications (4 hard of 4), Agricultural Production Economics (1 hard of 1), Development Economics (25 hard of 35).

    Leave untimed time for these and read every explanation, including for the options you rejected.

Official source: cem.cau.edu.cn

8 practice questions, worked

Original questions written to this exam's published syllabus and pattern. Not past papers.

1. North (1990) explained why inefficient institutions can persist for long periods mainly by

  1. the fact that competition between societies quickly eliminates any institution that does not maximise output
  2. increasing returns and path dependence, together with the interests of organisations created under existing rules
  3. the zero transaction costs of political markets, which always let the losers from a reform compensate the gainers
  4. the assumption that all agents hold the same accurate model of the economy and so agree on reform
Answer and working

B. increasing returns and path dependence, together with the interests of organisations created under existing rules

North rejected the efficiency view: institutions are set by those with bargaining power, show increasing returns (set-up, learning, coordination, adaptive expectations) and create organisations with a stake in them, so inefficient paths can lock in. Rapid competitive elimination, zero political transaction costs and shared accurate models are the assumptions he rejected.

Institutional Economics · Institutional change

2. Four people have incomes 0, 0, 0 and 100. Using the formula Gini = (sum over all ordered pairs of |x_i - x_j|) / (2 n^2 mean), the Gini is

  1. 0.75
  2. 1.00
  3. 0.38
  4. 0.25
Answer and working

A. 0.75

Pairs with a difference of 100: the rich person paired with each of three others, counted in both orders, 6 x 100 = 600. Mean = 25, n = 4: Gini = 600/(2 x 16 x 25) = 0.75. With n individuals the maximum discrete Gini is (n - 1)/n, not 1, a common trap. 0.38 counts each pair once (300/800 = 0.375), and 0.25 is 2B, twice the area under the Lorenz curve (2 x 0.125), instead of 1 - 2B.

Development Economics · Indicators of development

3. A contract gives a farmer 150 per season more than his next-best option. He discounts each future season by a factor of 0.8 and expects to be dropped permanently if he side-sells. This season side-selling would gain 400. Will he side-sell?

  1. No: the present value of future contract gains, 150 × 0.8 / 0.2 = 600, exceeds the 400 gain
  2. Yes: the 400 gain exceeds the 150 surplus he would lose in the next season alone
  3. No: the present value of future gains is 150 / 0.8 = 187.5, which exceeds the 150
  4. Yes: the present value of future gains is 150 × 0.8 = 120, which is below 400
Answer and working

A. No: the present value of future contract gains, 150 × 0.8 / 0.2 = 600, exceeds the 400 gain

The relational contract holds if the one-time gain is less than the present value of the future surplus lost: PV = 150δ/(1 − δ) = 150 × 0.8 / 0.2 = 600 > 400, so he does not side-sell. Comparing with only next season (150) or only one discounted season (120) ignores the stream of future seasons; 150/0.8 is not the formula and compares the wrong quantities.

Institutional Economics · Institutions and resource allocation

4. A tenant keeps half the output of Q = 60√F, where F is fertiliser, the output price is 1 and fertiliser costs 1.5 per unit. The tenant pays all fertiliser costs. How much fertiliser does he apply, compared with an owner-cultivator?

  1. 400 units, against 100 for an owner-cultivator
  2. 200 units, against 400 for an owner-cultivator
  3. 100 units, against 200 for an owner-cultivator
  4. 100 units, against 400 for an owner-cultivator
Answer and working

D. 100 units, against 400 for an owner-cultivator

MP of F = 30/√F. Owner: 30/√F = 1.5, √F = 20, F = 400. Tenant: 0.5 × 30/√F = 1.5, √F = 10, F = 100. Fertiliser falls to a quarter, not a half, because MP falls with √F; the reversed pair swaps the two cases.

Institutional Economics · Tenancy and sharecropping

5. Aleem's (1990) study of informal moneylenders in Chambar, Pakistan, found that their high interest rates mainly reflected

  1. government interest-rate ceilings that forced lenders to charge above the ceiling
  2. high screening, collection and default costs rather than large monopoly profits
  3. large monopoly profits, since lenders faced no competition from other lenders
  4. the very low cost of lending, which attracted too many lenders to the market
Answer and working

B. high screening, collection and default costs rather than large monopoly profits

Aleem measured lenders' costs and found that high rates were close to average costs, which were high because of screening, chasing repayment and defaults; monopolistic competition rather than pure monopoly profit. Ceilings and low costs are inconsistent with the findings.

Institutional Economics · Interlinked agrarian markets

6. Why might a landlord choose a share contract rather than a fixed rent when tenants are poor and cannot pay a large rent after a bad harvest?

  1. Limited liability means a fixed rent cannot be collected in bad years, so selling the farm to the tenant fails
  2. A share contract always gives the tenant stronger effort incentives than a fixed-rent contract does
  3. Share contracts are the only arrangement under which the tenant can supply family labour
  4. A fixed rent would make the landlord bear all output risk, which a risk-averse landlord would avoid
Answer and working

A. Limited liability means a fixed rent cannot be collected in bad years, so selling the farm to the tenant fails

When tenants cannot pay in bad states (limited liability), a high fixed rent is not enforceable, so the landlord cannot simply 'sell the farm'; a share adjusts payments to output. Share contracts give weaker, not stronger, incentives; under fixed rent the tenant, not the landlord, bears the risk; family labour can be used under any contract.

Institutional Economics · Tenancy and sharecropping

7. In Hayami and Kikuchi's account of Philippine rice villages, the shift from the hunusan harvesting system to the gama system is explained as

  1. a shift forced by a land reform law that abolished share contracts and imposed fixed wages on all farms
  2. a move by landless workers to raise their share of the harvest as labour became scarcer in the village
  3. the result of new combine harvesters that made manual harvesting labour unnecessary on most farms
  4. an adjustment of the customary harvest share toward the lower market wage as population pressure grew
Answer and working

D. an adjustment of the customary harvest share toward the lower market wage as population pressure grew

As population growth depressed real wages, the customary open harvest share exceeded the value of harvest labour; under gama only those who weeded without pay could harvest, which lowered the effective share toward the market wage without openly breaking custom. It was not imposed by law, caused by mechanisation, or a response to labour scarcity.

Institutional Economics · Institutional change

8. Why has food aid increasingly shifted from shipping donor-country surpluses toward cash transfers and local or regional purchase?

  1. Local purchase can increase the donor's farm exports, since regional traders buy their grain from donor countries
  2. Shipped food aid is prohibited by the WTO under the Agreement on Agriculture's export subsidy rules
  3. Cash transfers are always spent on food
  4. Local purchase and cash are usually cheaper and faster and do not depress local farmers' prices
Answer and working

D. Local purchase and cash are usually cheaper and faster and do not depress local farmers' prices

In-kind shipments from donors are slow, costly and can depress local farm prices, discouraging production; buying locally or giving cash supports local markets. The WTO does not prohibit food aid, cash is not always spent on food, and local purchase does not boost donor exports.

Development Economics · International development institutions

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