China · China Agricultural University College of Economics & Management
China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track (Agricultural Economics & Management) is a PhD, fellowship and lectureship exam run by China Agricultural University College of Economics & Management, for candidates in China.
Written specialised test 30% + interview 70%; at least 60 needed in each.
Our reading of the syllabus, from the questions we have written to this exam; the exam body's own weighting, where published, is under Format above.
Start here: read these subjects' manuals first and work their questions until the reasoning is automatic.
One pass per subject, then mixed sets across them.
Definitions, classifications and standard figures; quick to revise, easy marks to lose.
Leave untimed time for these and read every explanation, including for the options you rejected.
Official source: cem.cau.edu.cn
Original questions written to this exam's published syllabus and pattern. Not past papers.
1. North (1990) explained why inefficient institutions can persist for long periods mainly by
B. increasing returns and path dependence, together with the interests of organisations created under existing rules
North rejected the efficiency view: institutions are set by those with bargaining power, show increasing returns (set-up, learning, coordination, adaptive expectations) and create organisations with a stake in them, so inefficient paths can lock in. Rapid competitive elimination, zero political transaction costs and shared accurate models are the assumptions he rejected.
Institutional Economics · Institutional change
2. Four people have incomes 0, 0, 0 and 100. Using the formula Gini = (sum over all ordered pairs of |x_i - x_j|) / (2 n^2 mean), the Gini is
A. 0.75
Pairs with a difference of 100: the rich person paired with each of three others, counted in both orders, 6 x 100 = 600. Mean = 25, n = 4: Gini = 600/(2 x 16 x 25) = 0.75. With n individuals the maximum discrete Gini is (n - 1)/n, not 1, a common trap. 0.38 counts each pair once (300/800 = 0.375), and 0.25 is 2B, twice the area under the Lorenz curve (2 x 0.125), instead of 1 - 2B.
Development Economics · Indicators of development
3. A contract gives a farmer 150 per season more than his next-best option. He discounts each future season by a factor of 0.8 and expects to be dropped permanently if he side-sells. This season side-selling would gain 400. Will he side-sell?
A. No: the present value of future contract gains, 150 × 0.8 / 0.2 = 600, exceeds the 400 gain
The relational contract holds if the one-time gain is less than the present value of the future surplus lost: PV = 150δ/(1 − δ) = 150 × 0.8 / 0.2 = 600 > 400, so he does not side-sell. Comparing with only next season (150) or only one discounted season (120) ignores the stream of future seasons; 150/0.8 is not the formula and compares the wrong quantities.
Institutional Economics · Institutions and resource allocation
4. A tenant keeps half the output of Q = 60√F, where F is fertiliser, the output price is 1 and fertiliser costs 1.5 per unit. The tenant pays all fertiliser costs. How much fertiliser does he apply, compared with an owner-cultivator?
D. 100 units, against 400 for an owner-cultivator
MP of F = 30/√F. Owner: 30/√F = 1.5, √F = 20, F = 400. Tenant: 0.5 × 30/√F = 1.5, √F = 10, F = 100. Fertiliser falls to a quarter, not a half, because MP falls with √F; the reversed pair swaps the two cases.
Institutional Economics · Tenancy and sharecropping
5. Aleem's (1990) study of informal moneylenders in Chambar, Pakistan, found that their high interest rates mainly reflected
B. high screening, collection and default costs rather than large monopoly profits
Aleem measured lenders' costs and found that high rates were close to average costs, which were high because of screening, chasing repayment and defaults; monopolistic competition rather than pure monopoly profit. Ceilings and low costs are inconsistent with the findings.
Institutional Economics · Interlinked agrarian markets
6. Why might a landlord choose a share contract rather than a fixed rent when tenants are poor and cannot pay a large rent after a bad harvest?
A. Limited liability means a fixed rent cannot be collected in bad years, so selling the farm to the tenant fails
When tenants cannot pay in bad states (limited liability), a high fixed rent is not enforceable, so the landlord cannot simply 'sell the farm'; a share adjusts payments to output. Share contracts give weaker, not stronger, incentives; under fixed rent the tenant, not the landlord, bears the risk; family labour can be used under any contract.
Institutional Economics · Tenancy and sharecropping
7. In Hayami and Kikuchi's account of Philippine rice villages, the shift from the hunusan harvesting system to the gama system is explained as
D. an adjustment of the customary harvest share toward the lower market wage as population pressure grew
As population growth depressed real wages, the customary open harvest share exceeded the value of harvest labour; under gama only those who weeded without pay could harvest, which lowered the effective share toward the market wage without openly breaking custom. It was not imposed by law, caused by mechanisation, or a response to labour scarcity.
Institutional Economics · Institutional change
8. Why has food aid increasingly shifted from shipping donor-country surpluses toward cash transfers and local or regional purchase?
D. Local purchase and cash are usually cheaper and faster and do not depress local farmers' prices
In-kind shipments from donors are slow, costly and can depress local farm prices, discouraging production; buying locally or giving cash supports local markets. The WTO does not prohibit food aid, cash is not always spent on food, and local purchase does not boost donor exports.
Development Economics · International development institutions
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