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China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track Institutional Economics: practice questions

China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track (Agricultural Economics & Management) · China · China Agricultural University College of Economics & Management

Original practice questions written to the published syllabus · not past papers
10worked here, free
47written to this exam in this subject
8syllabus units

About China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track

China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track (Agricultural Economics & Management) is a PhD, fellowship and lectureship exam run by China Agricultural University College of Economics & Management, for candidates in China. Written specialised test 30% + interview 70%; at least 60 needed in each.

Source: cem.cau.edu.cn.

Checked against the exam body's published information. Formats and fees change; confirm the current edition there before you book.

Institutional Economics in China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track

Why institutions and transaction costs matter for how agricultural resources are used, and how agrarian institutions such as tenancy work.

Our 47 China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track questions in this subject: 0 easy, 20 medium, 27 hard, across 8 units.

10 practice questions, worked

Choose an answer, then open the working. Each explanation says why the right answer is right and why the others are not.

These 10 were written to China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track and are not shown on any other exam's page.

Question 1 · medium

Herbert Simon's description of human behaviour as 'intendedly rational, but only limitedly so', adopted in transaction cost economics, is called

  1. opportunism
  2. bounded rationality
  3. adaptive expectations
  4. methodological holism
Answer and working

B. bounded rationality

Williamson took bounded rationality from Simon; it implies that complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete. Opportunism ('self-interest seeking with guile') is the second, separate behavioural assumption. Methodological holism belongs to the old institutionalists.

Question 2 · medium

Williamson's 'fundamental transformation' refers to

  1. the move from a sharecropping contract to a fixed-rent contract as tenants accumulate wealth
  2. the replacement of informal norms by formal statutes as an economy becomes more developed
  3. the shift from large-numbers bidding before a contract to bilateral dependency after specific investment
  4. the conversion of an open-access resource into common property by a group of users
Answer and working

C. the shift from large-numbers bidding before a contract to bilateral dependency after specific investment

Before investment many suppliers can compete; once one has made a transaction-specific investment, the relationship is effectively bilateral and each side can be held up. The other options describe different processes (commons governance, tenancy change, formalisation).

Question 3 · medium

In Hayami and Kikuchi's account of Philippine rice villages, the shift from the hunusan harvesting system to the gama system is explained as

  1. a shift forced by a land reform law that abolished share contracts and imposed fixed wages on all farms
  2. a move by landless workers to raise their share of the harvest as labour became scarcer in the village
  3. the result of new combine harvesters that made manual harvesting labour unnecessary on most farms
  4. an adjustment of the customary harvest share toward the lower market wage as population pressure grew
Answer and working

D. an adjustment of the customary harvest share toward the lower market wage as population pressure grew

As population growth depressed real wages, the customary open harvest share exceeded the value of harvest labour; under gama only those who weeded without pay could harvest, which lowered the effective share toward the market wage without openly breaking custom. It was not imposed by law, caused by mechanisation, or a response to labour scarcity.

Question 4 · medium

North (1990) explained why inefficient institutions can persist for long periods mainly by

  1. the fact that competition between societies quickly eliminates any institution that does not maximise output
  2. increasing returns and path dependence, together with the interests of organisations created under existing rules
  3. the zero transaction costs of political markets, which always let the losers from a reform compensate the gainers
  4. the assumption that all agents hold the same accurate model of the economy and so agree on reform
Answer and working

B. increasing returns and path dependence, together with the interests of organisations created under existing rules

North rejected the efficiency view: institutions are set by those with bargaining power, show increasing returns (set-up, learning, coordination, adaptive expectations) and create organisations with a stake in them, so inefficient paths can lock in. Rapid competitive elimination, zero political transaction costs and shared accurate models are the assumptions he rejected.

Question 5 · hard

In Davis and North's (1971) model of institutional change, a new arrangement is adopted when

  1. technical change has made the old arrangement physically impossible to continue operating
  2. the expected net gains to a primary action group exceed the costs of organising and making the change
  3. the government decides that the arrangement maximises social welfare whatever the distribution of gains
  4. all members of society unanimously agree that the existing arrangement is no longer efficient
Answer and working

B. the expected net gains to a primary action group exceed the costs of organising and making the change

Davis and North modelled institutional innovation as occurring when perceived profits from a new arrangement exceed its costs, with primary action groups as entrepreneurs who organise to capture them. Unanimity, a benevolent planner or physical impossibility are not required.

Question 6 · medium

In a principal-agent model with a risk-neutral agent who has ample wealth, the first-best outcome can be achieved by

  1. a sharing rule giving the agent exactly half of output each season
  2. a fixed rent, making the agent residual claimant
  3. close monitoring of output with no link between pay and output
  4. a fixed wage paid to the agent regardless of the outcome
Answer and working

B. a fixed rent, making the agent residual claimant

When the agent is risk-neutral and not wealth-constrained, 'selling the firm to the agent' (fixed rent) gives him full marginal incentives with no cost of risk-bearing. A fixed wage gives no incentive; a half share dilutes incentives (the Marshallian problem); monitoring output without linking pay to it does not change effort.

Question 7 · hard

A contract gives a farmer 150 per season more than his next-best option. He discounts each future season by a factor of 0.8 and expects to be dropped permanently if he side-sells. This season side-selling would gain 400. Will he side-sell?

  1. No: the present value of future contract gains, 150 × 0.8 / 0.2 = 600, exceeds the 400 gain
  2. Yes: the 400 gain exceeds the 150 surplus he would lose in the next season alone
  3. No: the present value of future gains is 150 / 0.8 = 187.5, which exceeds the 150
  4. Yes: the present value of future gains is 150 × 0.8 = 120, which is below 400
Answer and working

A. No: the present value of future contract gains, 150 × 0.8 / 0.2 = 600, exceeds the 400 gain

The relational contract holds if the one-time gain is less than the present value of the future surplus lost: PV = 150δ/(1 − δ) = 150 × 0.8 / 0.2 = 600 > 400, so he does not side-sell. Comparing with only next season (150) or only one discounted season (120) ignores the stream of future seasons; 150/0.8 is not the formula and compares the wrong quantities.

Question 8 · hard

For a plot with output Q = 40√L, output price 1 and labour cost 2 per unit, a fixed-rent tenant applies 100 units of labour and a half-share tenant 25. What is the loss in total surplus (output minus labour cost) caused by sharecropping?

  1. 75
  2. 150
  3. 50
  4. 200
Answer and working

C. 50

Fixed rent: Q = 40 × 10 = 400, labour cost 200, surplus 200. Half share: Q = 40 × 5 = 200, labour cost 50, surplus 150. Loss = 200 − 150 = 50. 200 is the fall in output, ignoring the labour saved; 150 is the sharecropping surplus itself; 75 has no basis.

Question 9 · hard

A tenant keeps half the output of Q = 60√F, where F is fertiliser, the output price is 1 and fertiliser costs 1.5 per unit. The tenant pays all fertiliser costs. How much fertiliser does he apply, compared with an owner-cultivator?

  1. 400 units, against 100 for an owner-cultivator
  2. 200 units, against 400 for an owner-cultivator
  3. 100 units, against 200 for an owner-cultivator
  4. 100 units, against 400 for an owner-cultivator
Answer and working

D. 100 units, against 400 for an owner-cultivator

MP of F = 30/√F. Owner: 30/√F = 1.5, √F = 20, F = 400. Tenant: 0.5 × 30/√F = 1.5, √F = 10, F = 100. Fertiliser falls to a quarter, not a half, because MP falls with √F; the reversed pair swaps the two cases.

Question 10 · medium

Why might a landlord choose a share contract rather than a fixed rent when tenants are poor and cannot pay a large rent after a bad harvest?

  1. Limited liability means a fixed rent cannot be collected in bad years, so selling the farm to the tenant fails
  2. A share contract always gives the tenant stronger effort incentives than a fixed-rent contract does
  3. Share contracts are the only arrangement under which the tenant can supply family labour
  4. A fixed rent would make the landlord bear all output risk, which a risk-averse landlord would avoid
Answer and working

A. Limited liability means a fixed rent cannot be collected in bad years, so selling the farm to the tenant fails

When tenants cannot pay in bad states (limited liability), a high fixed rent is not enforceable, so the landlord cannot simply 'sell the farm'; a share adjusts payments to output. Share contracts give weaker, not stronger, incentives; under fixed rent the tenant, not the landlord, bears the risk; family labour can be used under any contract.

A study plan for Institutional Economics in China Agricultural University PhD, application-and-assessment track

This plan follows where our questions actually fall, so the time goes where the marks are likely to be. It is our reading of the syllabus, not the exam body's weighting.

  1. First, the heavy units (49% of the 47 questions): Institutional change (8, 17%); Institutions and resource allocation (8, 17%); Tenancy and sharecropping (7, 15%).

    Read the manual chapters for these first and do every worked question you can find on them.

  2. Then the middle band: Interlinked agrarian markets (6, 13%); Transaction costs (6, 13%); Collective action and the group approach (4, 9%).

    Aim for one sitting per unit, then mixed questions across them.

  3. Then the lighter units: Institutions and institutional economics (4, 9%); Property rights (4, 9%).

    Learn the definitions, classifications and standard numbers; these units are more often recalled than worked.

  4. Leave time for the hard ones: Collective action and the group approach (3 hard of 4), Institutions and institutional economics (3 hard of 4), Property rights (3 hard of 4).

    Come back to these after a first pass, untimed, and read every explanation, including for the options you rejected.

  5. Finish timed. Sit the subject as a timed set without notes, mark it, and send each wrong answer back to its unit above.

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