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Wageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies Institutional Economics: practice questions

Wageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies · Netherlands · Wageningen University & Research

Original practice questions written to the published syllabus · not past papers
10worked here, free
22written to this exam in this subject
8syllabus units

About Wageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies

Wageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies is a postgraduate admission exam run by Wageningen University & Research, for candidates in Netherlands. Five specialisations; entry on a relevant BSc.

Source: wur.nl.

Checked against the exam body's published information. Formats and fees change; confirm the current edition there before you book.

Institutional Economics in Wageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies

Why institutions and transaction costs matter for how agricultural resources are used, and how agrarian institutions such as tenancy work.

Our 22 Wageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies questions in this subject: 2 easy, 6 medium, 14 hard, across 8 units.

10 practice questions, worked

Choose an answer, then open the working. Each explanation says why the right answer is right and why the others are not.

These 10 were written to Wageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies and are not shown on any other exam's page.

Question 1 · hard

A researcher studies why mango processors in one region buy fruit through annual contracts while those in another buy on spot markets, taking land law and caste norms as given. In Williamson's four-level scheme the research is located at

  1. Level 4, resource allocation, because the processors are deciding quantities to buy
  2. Level 3, governance, the play of the game through contracts and organisational form
  3. Level 1, embeddedness, because caste norms enter the analysis of the transaction
  4. Level 2, institutional environment, because contract choice depends on land law
Answer and working

B. Level 3, governance, the play of the game through contracts and organisational form

The choice between spot purchase and contracting is a choice of governance structure — Level 3. Land law (Level 2) and caste norms (Level 1) are held fixed as constraints; Level 4 would concern marginal input and output decisions given the governance structure, not the choice of governance itself.

Question 2 · hard

Williamson summarised opportunism as 'self-interest seeking with guile'. Why does TCE need opportunism in addition to bounded rationality to explain governance structures?

  1. Without opportunism, asset specificity would fall to zero because all investments could then be redeployed without loss
  2. Without opportunism, gaps in incomplete contracts could be filled by promises to behave cooperatively when contingencies arise
  3. Without opportunism, transaction costs would become negative and firms would expand until one firm produced everything
  4. Without opportunism, bounded rationality would itself disappear because parties would share all their private information freely
Answer and working

B. Without opportunism, gaps in incomplete contracts could be filled by promises to behave cooperatively when contingencies arise

Bounded rationality makes contracts incomplete; but if no one exploited the gaps, a general clause promising cooperative adaptation would suffice and elaborate governance would be unnecessary. Opportunism does not create or remove bounded rationality or asset specificity — those are separate; nor do transaction costs become negative.

Question 3 · easy

In transaction cost economics, the most important dimension along which transactions differ is

  1. frequency
  2. asset specificity
  3. price elasticity of demand
  4. market size
Answer and working

B. asset specificity

Williamson identified asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency as the critical dimensions and treated asset specificity as the most important because it creates bilateral dependency. Price elasticity and market size are not among the three dimensions.

Question 4 · hard

A grower can build a cold room costing 160 that is useful only for supplying one exporter. If the grower supplies the exporter, the joint surplus is 300; otherwise the cold room is worth nothing. After the investment the parties split the 300 equally. Will a profit-maximising grower invest?

  1. Yes: the grower receives 150 and the cost is sunk once built, so it is ignored in the decision
  2. No: the investment is inefficient because the 300 surplus is less than twice the 160 cost
  3. Yes: the investment creates 300 of surplus against a cost of 160, so the grower gains 140
  4. No: the grower expects 150, which is less than the 160 cost, although the investment is efficient
Answer and working

D. No: the grower expects 150, which is less than the 160 cost, although the investment is efficient

Ex post the grower receives 0.5 × 300 = 150. Ex ante the decision compares 150 with the cost 160, so 150 − 160 = −10 and the grower does not invest. Yet 300 > 160, so investment is efficient: this is hold-up. The 'gain 140' answer wrongly assumes the grower keeps the whole surplus; the cost is not sunk before investing, so it cannot be ignored; and efficiency requires only surplus > cost, not twice the cost.

Question 5 · hard

Governance costs for a transaction with asset specificity k are 20 + 6k under the market, 30 + 3k under a hybrid and 45 + k under hierarchy. At k = 5, which governance structure minimises cost?

  1. Hierarchy, at 50
  2. Market, at 50
  3. Hybrid, at 45
  4. Hierarchy, at 45
Answer and working

C. Hybrid, at 45

At k = 5: market 20 + 30 = 50; hybrid 30 + 15 = 45; hierarchy 45 + 5 = 50. The hybrid is cheapest. Switch points are market = hybrid at k = 10/3 ≈ 3.3 and hybrid = hierarchy at k = 7.5, so k = 5 lies in the hybrid range. 'Hierarchy at 45' adds 45 + 0 by forgetting the k term.

Question 6 · medium

North and Weingast (1989) argued that England's Glorious Revolution of 1688 promoted growth chiefly because it

  1. abolished the common fields and enclosed agricultural land into private holdings throughout the kingdom
  2. established a central bank that could print money to finance the Crown's wars without borrowing
  3. created credible commitment by the Crown not to expropriate, through Parliament's control of taxation and independent courts
  4. introduced free trade in grain by repealing the Corn Laws and lowering food prices for urban workers
Answer and working

C. created credible commitment by the Crown not to expropriate, through Parliament's control of taxation and independent courts

North and Weingast emphasised credible commitment: constraints on the Crown lowered the risk of default and expropriation, which lowered the cost of public borrowing. Enclosure was a long earlier process; the Corn Laws were repealed in 1846; printing money to avoid borrowing is the opposite of their argument.

Question 7 · hard

A processor's contract growers side-sell whenever spot prices rise well above the fixed contract price, while the processor rejects more produce on 'quality' grounds when spot prices fall. Which redesign best addresses both problems?

  1. A higher fixed contract price set once a year, with grading by the processor's own field staff
  2. Legal action against side-sellers, with no change to price formula or quality grading
  3. A base price plus a share of any spot premium, with grading by an independent third party
  4. A contract that pays the spot price at delivery, with no commitment to buy any quantity
Answer and working

C. A base price plus a share of any spot premium, with grading by an independent third party

A risk-sharing formula narrows the gap between spot and contract prices when markets rise (reducing the side-selling gain), and independent grading makes quality verifiable, limiting opportunistic rejection. A higher fixed price still leaves a gap in booms and does nothing about grading; a pure spot-price contract abandons the assurance both sides need; litigation is slow and costly with weak courts.

Question 8 · easy

Which of the following is one of Ostrom's design principles for long-enduring common-pool resource institutions?

  1. Uniform rules imposed by a national agency on all sites
  2. Unlimited entry so that the resource is used by all who need it
  3. Monitoring carried out only by outside officials unknown to the users
  4. Graduated sanctions for users who violate the rules
Answer and working

D. Graduated sanctions for users who violate the rules

Ostrom's principles include clearly defined boundaries, rules congruent with local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring by people accountable to users, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, recognition of the right to organise and nested enterprises. Uniform national rules contradict congruence; unlimited entry contradicts boundaries; monitoring must be accountable to users.

Question 9 · hard

A fishery's total catch is Y = 40E − E² for fishing effort E. Fish sell at a price of 1 and each unit of effort costs 8. What are the effort levels under open access and under rent-maximising management?

  1. 32 under open access and 16 under rent maximisation
  2. 20 under open access and 16 under rent maximisation
  3. 16 under open access and 32 under rent maximisation
  4. 32 under open access and 20 under rent maximisation
Answer and working

A. 32 under open access and 16 under rent maximisation

Open access: entry continues until average revenue equals cost, 40 − E = 8, so E = 32 (catch 256, rent 0). Rent maximisation: marginal revenue equals cost, 40 − 2E = 8, so E = 16 (catch 384, rent 384 − 128 = 256). E = 20 is the effort that maximises catch (40 − 2E = 0), ignoring cost.

Question 10 · hard

Goldstein and Udry (2008) studied plots in Ghana and found that farmers with less political power in local land allocation

  1. sold their plots to more powerful farmers at a premium over the market value
  2. obtained higher yields, because they worked harder to prove their claims
  3. fallowed their plots more, because they faced no risk of losing the land
  4. fallowed their plots less, fearing loss of the land, and obtained lower yields
Answer and working

D. fallowed their plots less, fearing loss of the land, and obtained lower yields

Fallowing restores fertility but, under customary tenure, a fallow plot risked reallocation for those without political connections, so they fallowed less and suffered lower productivity — evidence that tenure insecurity distorts resource allocation. The other options reverse or invent the finding.

A study plan for Institutional Economics in Wageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies

This plan follows where our questions actually fall, so the time goes where the marks are likely to be. It is our reading of the syllabus, not the exam body's weighting.

  1. First, the heavy units (50% of the 22 questions): Collective action and the group approach (4, 18%); Transaction costs (4, 18%); Institutions and institutional economics (3, 14%).

    Read the manual chapters for these first and do every worked question you can find on them.

  2. Then the middle band: Institutions and resource allocation (3, 14%); Property rights (3, 14%); Institutional change (2, 9%).

    Aim for one sitting per unit, then mixed questions across them.

  3. Then the lighter units: Tenancy and sharecropping (2, 9%); Interlinked agrarian markets (1, 5%).

    Learn the definitions, classifications and standard numbers; these units are more often recalled than worked.

  4. Leave time for the hard ones: Tenancy and sharecropping (2 hard of 2), Interlinked agrarian markets (1 hard of 1), Institutions and institutional economics (2 hard of 3).

    Come back to these after a first pass, untimed, and read every explanation, including for the options you rejected.

  5. Bank the easy marks: Collective action and the group approach (1 easy of 4); Transaction costs (1 easy of 4).

    Do these early in revision so they are fast on the day.

  6. Finish timed. Sit the subject as a timed set without notes, mark it, and send each wrong answer back to its unit above.

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