Wageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies · Netherlands · Wageningen University & Research
Original practice questions written to the published syllabus · not past papersWageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies is a postgraduate admission exam run by Wageningen University & Research, for candidates in Netherlands. Five specialisations; entry on a relevant BSc.
Source: wur.nl.
Checked against the exam body's published information. Formats and fees change; confirm the current edition there before you book.
Why institutions and transaction costs matter for how agricultural resources are used, and how agrarian institutions such as tenancy work.
Our 22 Wageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies questions in this subject: 2 easy, 6 medium, 14 hard, across 8 units.
Choose an answer, then open the working. Each explanation says why the right answer is right and why the others are not.
These 10 were written to Wageningen MSc Management, Economics & Consumer Studies and are not shown on any other exam's page.
A researcher studies why mango processors in one region buy fruit through annual contracts while those in another buy on spot markets, taking land law and caste norms as given. In Williamson's four-level scheme the research is located at
B. Level 3, governance, the play of the game through contracts and organisational form
The choice between spot purchase and contracting is a choice of governance structure — Level 3. Land law (Level 2) and caste norms (Level 1) are held fixed as constraints; Level 4 would concern marginal input and output decisions given the governance structure, not the choice of governance itself.
Williamson summarised opportunism as 'self-interest seeking with guile'. Why does TCE need opportunism in addition to bounded rationality to explain governance structures?
B. Without opportunism, gaps in incomplete contracts could be filled by promises to behave cooperatively when contingencies arise
Bounded rationality makes contracts incomplete; but if no one exploited the gaps, a general clause promising cooperative adaptation would suffice and elaborate governance would be unnecessary. Opportunism does not create or remove bounded rationality or asset specificity — those are separate; nor do transaction costs become negative.
In transaction cost economics, the most important dimension along which transactions differ is
B. asset specificity
Williamson identified asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency as the critical dimensions and treated asset specificity as the most important because it creates bilateral dependency. Price elasticity and market size are not among the three dimensions.
A grower can build a cold room costing 160 that is useful only for supplying one exporter. If the grower supplies the exporter, the joint surplus is 300; otherwise the cold room is worth nothing. After the investment the parties split the 300 equally. Will a profit-maximising grower invest?
D. No: the grower expects 150, which is less than the 160 cost, although the investment is efficient
Ex post the grower receives 0.5 × 300 = 150. Ex ante the decision compares 150 with the cost 160, so 150 − 160 = −10 and the grower does not invest. Yet 300 > 160, so investment is efficient: this is hold-up. The 'gain 140' answer wrongly assumes the grower keeps the whole surplus; the cost is not sunk before investing, so it cannot be ignored; and efficiency requires only surplus > cost, not twice the cost.
Governance costs for a transaction with asset specificity k are 20 + 6k under the market, 30 + 3k under a hybrid and 45 + k under hierarchy. At k = 5, which governance structure minimises cost?
C. Hybrid, at 45
At k = 5: market 20 + 30 = 50; hybrid 30 + 15 = 45; hierarchy 45 + 5 = 50. The hybrid is cheapest. Switch points are market = hybrid at k = 10/3 ≈ 3.3 and hybrid = hierarchy at k = 7.5, so k = 5 lies in the hybrid range. 'Hierarchy at 45' adds 45 + 0 by forgetting the k term.
North and Weingast (1989) argued that England's Glorious Revolution of 1688 promoted growth chiefly because it
C. created credible commitment by the Crown not to expropriate, through Parliament's control of taxation and independent courts
North and Weingast emphasised credible commitment: constraints on the Crown lowered the risk of default and expropriation, which lowered the cost of public borrowing. Enclosure was a long earlier process; the Corn Laws were repealed in 1846; printing money to avoid borrowing is the opposite of their argument.
A processor's contract growers side-sell whenever spot prices rise well above the fixed contract price, while the processor rejects more produce on 'quality' grounds when spot prices fall. Which redesign best addresses both problems?
C. A base price plus a share of any spot premium, with grading by an independent third party
A risk-sharing formula narrows the gap between spot and contract prices when markets rise (reducing the side-selling gain), and independent grading makes quality verifiable, limiting opportunistic rejection. A higher fixed price still leaves a gap in booms and does nothing about grading; a pure spot-price contract abandons the assurance both sides need; litigation is slow and costly with weak courts.
Which of the following is one of Ostrom's design principles for long-enduring common-pool resource institutions?
D. Graduated sanctions for users who violate the rules
Ostrom's principles include clearly defined boundaries, rules congruent with local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring by people accountable to users, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, recognition of the right to organise and nested enterprises. Uniform national rules contradict congruence; unlimited entry contradicts boundaries; monitoring must be accountable to users.
A fishery's total catch is Y = 40E − E² for fishing effort E. Fish sell at a price of 1 and each unit of effort costs 8. What are the effort levels under open access and under rent-maximising management?
A. 32 under open access and 16 under rent maximisation
Open access: entry continues until average revenue equals cost, 40 − E = 8, so E = 32 (catch 256, rent 0). Rent maximisation: marginal revenue equals cost, 40 − 2E = 8, so E = 16 (catch 384, rent 384 − 128 = 256). E = 20 is the effort that maximises catch (40 − 2E = 0), ignoring cost.
Goldstein and Udry (2008) studied plots in Ghana and found that farmers with less political power in local land allocation
D. fallowed their plots less, fearing loss of the land, and obtained lower yields
Fallowing restores fertility but, under customary tenure, a fallow plot risked reallocation for those without political connections, so they fallowed less and suffered lower productivity — evidence that tenure insecurity distorts resource allocation. The other options reverse or invent the finding.
This plan follows where our questions actually fall, so the time goes where the marks are likely to be. It is our reading of the syllabus, not the exam body's weighting.
Read the manual chapters for these first and do every worked question you can find on them.
Aim for one sitting per unit, then mixed questions across them.
Learn the definitions, classifications and standard numbers; these units are more often recalled than worked.
Come back to these after a first pass, untimed, and read every explanation, including for the options you rejected.
Do these early in revision so they are fast on the day.
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