UGC-NET (June 2025) · India · National Testing Agency
Original practice questions written to the published syllabus · not past papersUGC-NET (June 2025) is a PhD, fellowship and lectureship exam run by National Testing Agency, for candidates in India. CBT (since Dec 2018). Paper I 50 questions / 100 marks; Paper II 100 questions / 200 marks; 180 minutes total; +2, no negative marking.
Source: ugcnet.nta.ac.in.
Checked against the exam body's published information. Formats and fees change; confirm the current edition there before you book.
Short models worked on paper: share-tenancy input choice, principal-agent incentive and participation constraints, hold-up and quasi-rents, repeated-game cooperation thresholds, open-access versus optimal effort; and the institutions-and-development literature (North, Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson, critiques).
Why institutions and transaction costs matter for how agricultural resources are used, and how agrarian institutions such as tenancy work.
Our 51 UGC-NET questions in this subject: 10 easy, 23 medium, 18 hard, across 8 units.
Choose an answer, then open the working. Each explanation says why the right answer is right and why the others are not.
These 10 were written to UGC-NET and are not shown on any other exam's page.
What did Coase himself regard as the main policy lesson of 'The Problem of Social Cost'?
A. Since real transaction costs are positive, the legal assignment of rights and the choice of institution affect efficiency
Coase stressed that the zero-cost world is a benchmark; because transaction costs are positive, law and institutional choice matter, and each remedy (liability, regulation, tax, merger) must be compared at its real cost. The 'never intervene' reading is a common misreading; automatic Pigovian taxation and blanket public ownership were exactly the one-size answers he criticised.
According to Williamson's discriminating alignment hypothesis, as asset specificity rises from low to high the efficient governance structure moves
A. from market to hybrid to hierarchy
Markets have strong incentives and autonomous adaptation, best when assets are generic; hierarchies have strong coordinated adaptation, best when specificity creates bilateral dependency; hybrids fit in between (Williamson 1991).
China's household responsibility system, spreading from about 1978, is a standard example of institutional change because it
D. returned farming decisions and residual output to households while land stayed collectively owned
Under the household responsibility system households contracted for land from the collective, delivered a quota and kept the residual, which sharply improved incentives; land ownership remained collective, so full private ownership did not occur. It moved away from, not toward, state farms, and procurement and price reforms were gradual.
Akerlof's 'market for lemons' (1970) shows that
A. when buyers cannot observe quality, good-quality sellers may leave and the market can unravel
Akerlof's adverse-selection model: buyers pay for average quality, so owners of good units withdraw, lowering average quality further. Prices falling to marginal cost describes competition, efficient bargaining is the Coase theorem, and integration to avoid opportunism is TCE.
Elinor Ostrom's best-known book on the self-governance of common-pool resources is
B. Governing the Commons (1990)
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990) set out her design principles. Markets and Hierarchies is Williamson's; The Mystery of Capital is de Soto's; Why Nations Fail is Acemoglu and Robinson's.
Some collective-action problems are better modelled as an assurance (stag-hunt) game than a prisoner's dilemma. The key difference is that in an assurance game
A. cooperating is the best reply when others cooperate, so the problem is building mutual trust
In a stag hunt, mutual cooperation and mutual defection are both equilibria; a player prefers to cooperate if he expects others to, so expectations and trust decide the outcome. A dominant strategy to defect describes the prisoner's dilemma; single-mover and zero-sum descriptions do not fit either game.
Besley (1995) found that stronger land rights were associated with more tree planting in parts of Ghana but cautioned about interpretation. Why?
C. Planting trees can itself strengthen land claims, so investment may cause rights rather than rights cause investment
In many customary systems planting trees helps establish a claim, so causation can run from investment to rights; Besley used instruments to address this. Tree planting is investment; Ghanaian land is largely under customary tenure, not entirely state-owned; theory predicts rights raise investment, not reduce it.
Barzel's analysis of property rights adds which insight to Demsetz's?
D. Rights are never complete; attributes too costly to measure are left in the public domain and people spend resources capturing them
Barzel emphasised that because measuring every attribute of an asset is costly, rights are partly delineated, leaving some value in the 'public domain' to be captured, which shapes contracts and organisation. Titles do not make rights complete; customs and private agreements also create rights; and rights clearly affect efficiency when transaction costs are positive.
A tenant gets half the output but pays the full cost of fertiliser. Heady (1947) showed that the distortion in fertiliser use can be removed by
B. sharing the cost of fertiliser in the same proportion as the output
If the landlord pays share (1 − s) of the input cost, the tenant equates s × MP to s × price, which reduces to MP = price — the efficient rule. If the landlord paid all of it, the tenant would over-apply; a wage contract changes effort incentives; legal quantities ignore variation between plots.
Critics of Bhaduri's semi-feudalism thesis argued that a landlord-lender facing a yield-raising innovation would generally prefer to
B. adopt it and recover the lost interest income by adjusting the crop share or loan terms
Because the landlord can renegotiate the share and the interest rate together, he can capture the extra surplus from innovation, so blocking it is usually not optimal (Braverman, Stiglitz, Srinivasan and others), though resistance can arise in special contract structures. The 'always block' claim is the thesis being criticised; the other options are not the critics' argument.
This plan follows where our questions actually fall, so the time goes where the marks are likely to be. It is our reading of the syllabus, not the exam body's weighting.
Read the manual chapters for these first and do every worked question you can find on them.
Aim for one sitting per unit, then mixed questions across them.
Learn the definitions, classifications and standard numbers; these units are more often recalled than worked.
Come back to these after a first pass, untimed, and read every explanation, including for the options you rejected.
Do these early in revision so they are fast on the day.
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